In a landscape where social science research on quantification in Africa remains very fragmentary, the publication of Poor Numbers has drawn attention to Morten Jerven's work.
essays, 7 and other more strictly academic individual and collective works. 8 Comparing and contrasting these works reveals the author's construction of his research topic as well as his methods of investigation and evidence building. Revealing the architecture of his work in this way enables us to uncover the overall logic behind the development of his arguments and to identify those elements that are absent or overlooked.
Studying and Testing Calculation Methods
This is a mainstay of Jerven's method. Whether studying the African continent as a whole or considering particular nations, he brings economic narratives from the 1950s to the present day face-to-face with an examination of the statistical techniques that supposedly underpin them. This has led him to observe and study the methods used by economists and statisticians, to identify them in documents and archives, and to use statistical techniques himself. His research deals with three types of economic and statistical works: international databases, the statistics produced by national administrations, and the academic research of development economists. To demonstrate the artificial and questionable nature of comparisons and rankings based on the gross domestic product (GDP) of African countries from the 1960s to the present day, Jerven points out the weaknesses and incoherencies in the three databases most frequently used by development economists (the World Bank's World Development Indicators, the University of Pennsylvania's Penn World Tables, and the Maddison Project at the University of Groningen in the Netherlands). 9 To counter the usual interpretations of economic trajectories in Africa, he explores the economic literature and highlights the technical "tricks" and methodological concessions used to explain growth levels on the continent. In so doing, he denounces the disproportionate importance accorded to econometric methods, seen as the panacea of the academic world. 10 Jerven's work also includes national case studies, and he seeks in particular to demonstrate the weaknesses and inconsistencies that can be found in data series relating to GDP and its components: research that requires him to dissect the calculation methods used in national accounts over several decades. In the book derived from his PhD thesis, national case studies looking at Botswana, Kenya, Tanzania, and Zambia from 1965 to 1995 form the core of this approach. 11 In my view, his examination of numbers has never been as effective and convincing as it is in this volume, despite the fact that it has not received as much media coverage as his other work. His meticulous analysis of the operations performed on the series of national accounts enables him to make each methodological shift or modification linked to a rupture in a country's history (an external shock, the opening or closure of industries, a political crisis, etc.) a pretext for questioning transformations in economic quantification. Jerven thus shows that national accounts must be understood in context and that economic analysis, presented in a standardized language, is dependent on multiple and contingent factors that are built into the numbers through the practices of those who calculate them. 12 The austere data of GDP and its components by sector of activity open a window not only onto the course of economic events, but also onto broader historical dynamics. By following a classical description, based primarily on gray literature and the mining of statistical institution archives, Jerven finely documents the co-construction of statistics, state actions, and social reality. 13 In several of his texts, he completes this approach by studying the calculation methods used by the early experts and academics who developed estimations of national income in the 1940s or 1950s (notably for Tanganyika, Rhodesia, Nyasaland, and Nigeria).
14 This precise level of examination provides Jerven with the impetus and the conceptual and methodological basis for his subsequent books. Poor Numbers and Africa expand upon and generalize the results from two chapters of the book based on his PhD thesis by reflecting on the continent as a whole. 15 But when Jerven formulates narratives about the lack of reliability of figures at the continental level, and denounces the weaknesses of economic analyses, he gives in to the temptation of generalizing too quickly, and launches into a less solidly empirical approach that mars the clarity of his observations. Most importantly, this leads him away from a fine-grained sociology of numbers in Africa.
Continental Narratives
A large part of the book based on Jerven's PhD thesis is devoted to a detailed description of national numbers. In his subsequent publications, however, the center of gravity has shifted, with the development of international discourses on economic growth in Africa becoming the main target of his research (through comparisons and international rankings in Poor Numbers, and through econometric regression analyses in Africa). His aim, in these two studies, is to impress upon his audience the inanity and weakness of the international discourse. For Jerven, this focus is justified for a number of reasons. Monographs, which used to be the priority for development economists, have been left aside in favor of international studies, 16 while the quality of national statistical methods has fallen due to the budget restrictions imposed on countries during structural adjustment programs, encouraging the use of international databases. 17 More prosaically, it has become fashionable within economic development circles to seek to explain the "determinants" of African growth, a tendency that should be condemned. Finally, there is a lack of transparency in the formation of international databases, which also needs to be revealed with a view to opening up public debate.
However, in his most recent works, Jerven has lost some of the depth of focus that characterized his previous approaches. In Poor Numbers, the cornerstone of his reasoning rests on demonstrating the inconsistency of international databases, through the method of applying tests to statistical series. 18 Outlined in the book's introduction, this demonstration is followed by an often rich analysis of data production processes across a range of national case studies and periods, confirming that numbers pose questions of reliability and comparability. In Africa, Jerven examines the econometric methods used in a series of key works on development economics and points to the existence of major flaws in their reasoning and demonstrations. He uses this to argue that the standard descriptions of African growth are damaging and incorrect. However, the almost ethnographic attention that he paid to statistical methods in his earlier work is not replicated in his engagement with these international subjects. He presents databases as black boxes, the secrets of which cannot be revealed by the sociologist armed with questionnaires-which contributes to proving their lack of transparency and arbitrary nature. 19 He also defines the methods of economists as obscure and unjustifiable. 20 As I will show, this interpretation seems too hasty. Most importantly, it has consequences for the scope and significance of his approach: by basing his entire framework on the analysis of devices that he can only partially describe, Jerven is no longer able to reveal the co-construction of figures and the social world in such a convincing manner. His criticism of the opacity of quantitative methods becomes the focus of his whole approach.
Jerven's method of building evidence adds to this impression, as he bases his reasoning on arguments established in his past work, bringing them to bear 16. Morten Jerven, "Un demi-siècle de fictions de croissance en Afrique," Politique africaine 124 (2011): 29-42. 17. Jerven, Poor Numbers, 11-17. 18. Jerven, Poor Numbers, chap. 1. In particular, the author shows that the various rankings are not consistent among themselves and that these differences cannot be explained by disparities between the methodologies used. These arguments are also developed in a number of his articles, for example Morten Jerven, "Random Growth in Africa? Lessons from an Evaluation of the Growth Evidence on Botswana, Kenya, Tanzania and Zambia, on cases other than those previously studied. For example, his PhD thesis documented the way in which the informalization of several national economies at the turn of the 1980s undermined GDP calculations, artificially lowering the aggregates of the countries concerned (particularly Zambia and Tanzania). 21 However, he frequently reprises this argument as if it were valid across the African continent as a whole, 22 even making it one of the central points of his latest work. 23 Similarly, his thesis showed that significant discrepancies may exist between two sets of national accounts for the same country, depending on whether or not they have been subject to a recent update, but in his later work he considers that some basic information on such "rebasements" is sufficient to prove the "poor quality" of the numbers.
24
These redeployments result in a change of approach. While his argument provides very rich empirical information on the development of numbers in various national cases-Tanzania, Nigeria, Ghana, and Zambia are described in depth in his recent works-Jerven is no longer as interested in seeking out the clues these figures provide about particular histories, and instead builds a global narrative about the weakness of African statistics and the practices of development economists. This position is reflected in the sources Jerven uses: in his latest work, interviews and first-hand empirical materials play no more than a subsidiary role compared to the critique of academic articles about African growth in the "postcolonial era."
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Numbers and Singularities
At the end of the 1990s, Randall Packard and Frederick Cooper observed that there was no single way of thinking about development, that professionals in this field were not a homogeneous group, and that criticism leveled at such discourse as being divorced from reality did not hold up to empirical examination. 26 Development instruments and the social relationships they engender lead to dispersed and differentiated practices. Despite the plethora of information and factors highlighted by Jerven, his research is not entirely free from this shortcoming. This is particularly the case in Africa, where he runs the risk of overstating the importance and coherence of the very econometric procedures and growth analyses he denounces, by presenting them as prevailing across Africa and as being generally accepted in the academic and development spheres. Unlike in Poor Numbers, here the national level is largely lost from view. The very nature of his object of study-the research of international academics-is not sufficient justification: Jerven This propensity for producing assessments with general relevance also affects his older work. For example, Jerven represents decolonization as a moment of statistical rupture, notably arguing that the figures produced in the colonial period reflected imperial "politics of difference," 28 while with independence the focus shifted to citizens being counted in order to belong to the nation. 29 Such a view is contested by researchers working in geographical areas other than those studied by Jerven, particularly in French-speaking countries: Vincent Bonnecase shows for example that in French West Africa the calculation of national income was a tool of economic valorization and an instrument of inclusion that enabled the "granary state" to manage the supply of food to rural populations and avoid tensions between the people and the colonial state. 30 Jerven's view of a statistical rupture linked to decolonization, although very interesting, would benefit from being brought back to his particular case studies and compared with other national trajectories.
Numbers and Historical Situations
In his diverse body of work, Jerven has sought to uncover the links between the production of national statistics and the historical processes of state formation. During the colonial period, the first calculations of national income, performed by colonial administrators or by academics, revealed the techniques employed by the imperial powers. 31 In the 1960s and 1970s, statistical systems reflected modernizing and developmentalist endeavors, as well as their failures. In the 1980s and 1990s, as these systems were weakened by structural adjustment programs, the informal aspects of the economy developed. 32 Given the attention that Jerven has paid to the historicity of practices, and considering his goal of reinterpreting African trajectories through the study of numbers, 33 postcolonial period, his subject is limited to the observation of current econometric practices, with little interest in historicizing methods of growth analysis. The econometric zeal of the 1990s and 2000s that he depicts is not, curiously, compared with the materials he has assembled on growth narratives in the 1960s and 1970s. His recent works no longer attempt to describe the numbers at work in evolving historical circumstances.
A similar assessment can also be made of Jerven's central argument in Poor Numbers. In this book, Jerven does return by various routes to the history of African statistics. But in his criticism of international comparison methods, he does not really consider how the emergence of such comparative practices has transformed the conduct of policies at a national level-or whether this is a relevant question. He tackles this issue only laterally, by criticizing the growing unreliability of numbers, which he attributes in particular to lower investment in the funding of statistics on the continental scale. 34 His choice of an international object thus seems to draw him away from his previous emphasis on an in-depth understanding of historical trajectories seen through calculation practices. Yet the production of economic growth figures in Africa is also part of the everyday functioning of national administrations, and societal transformations can be interpreted with precision and empirical richness at this level-as Jerven ably showed in his thesis by comparing, for example, the historical trajectories of formerly socialist Tanzania and mineral-rich Botswana.
An Economist Rather than a Specialist in the Social Sciences
As a specialist in the historical sociology of quantification, I become a little uneasy when Jerven adopts methods of generalization and evidence building that are closer to the paradigms and methods of quantitative economics than those of the social sciences. By this I do not of course mean his use of internal criticism, when he seeks to invalidate the technical work of economists by using their own methods and by challenging the relevance and robustness of their arguments. This internal criticism, which he explains and reproduces for a non-expert audience, is sufficiently heuristic and effective to demonstrate the tinkering and small accommodations of development economists. However, his focus on this work is not always expanded into a contextualized analysis of calculation as a social practice.
Thus, in Africa, Jerven is content to refer to the group of "economists" as a whole, seemingly taking its boundaries for granted, even if he does concede the existence of a certain degree of diversity ("there are many economists who do useful analysis" 35 ). He does not provide a detailed study of the plurality of methods and schools of thought within development economics, of the tensions that run through it, or of the attempts to challenge or dissent from dominant paradigms, particularly in Africa. 36 Nor does he enter into a detailed description of the institutions in which these economists develop: he does not, for example, mention any university departments or think tanks, nor discuss the links between such bodies and large institutions such as the World Bank. 37 Although he discusses the school of thought of a group of development economists, he does not provide a sociological characterization of their discourses and practices, nor attempt to situate them within the various trends in their field.
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I am particularly uneasy when Jerven's approach leads him to adopt the epistemology of the economists he is criticizing. This is especially apparent when he discusses debates on the use of variables such as "ethnic" or "linguistic fragmentation" in econometric regression analyses to explain the level of growth 39 : while he demonstrates that the economists' conclusions are inappropriate, and shows the fragile nature of their variables, he considers the debate about the role of ethnicity in growth to be legitimate, and takes a side. 40 This lack of distancing from economics is in fact a recurrent issue in Jerven's work: in his thesis, he explains that he does not work on French-speaking countries because, as they belong to the CFA franc zone, the variable representing the gap between the official exchange rate and the black market exchange rate is unavailable. As this variable was often used in the econometric literature of the 1990s, he considers that these countries are not "normal" cases and excludes them from his sample. 41 In such conditions, when he makes observations about subjects as general as "growth in Africa during the postcolonial period" as described by "economists," without ever defining his terms in regard to the social sciences, it becomes difficult to grasp the scope of Jerven's conclusions. While he lifts the veil from the discipline of economics, his distancing is somewhat misleading and the speculations thus outlined, no matter how stimulating, move away from a method of reasoning based on the detailed observation of the work of economists as social practices.
An Epistemological Ambiguity
There is a persistent ambiguity, if not a lack of coherence, in Jerven's relationship to the social sciences. On the one hand, he leans on terminology and methods of reasoning borrowed from the history and sociology of quantification and measurement: he takes as his subject the changing "metrics" of development, considers it necessary to tackle the forms of rationality in their history, and also alludes to "statistical fictions." 42 When he describes the changing conventions of measurement that have been used to record production since the colonial periodwhich he indicates with the concept of the "production boundary"-he is using an epistemology inspired by a conventionalist perspective, showing how "what is counted counts."
43 By studying national data through the contextual factors that influence calculation, he also situates himself de facto in a nominalist, non-realist reading of measurement.
On the other hand, Jerven employs a vocabulary that is unfailingly located in the field of metrological realism (with the repeated use of the adjective "poor" to describe data or policies, history described as "right," the use of the register of precision, etc.). As his theoretical discussion is sporadic and lacks depth, it is sometimes difficult to figure out. 44 Although he dedicates a passage in the introduction of Poor Numbers to presenting his conception of statistical "ethnography" 45 and cites various key works in this field, 46 the role of social approaches to numbers in his assessment remains secondary. He cautiously references the work of Deirdre McCloskey on economics as rhetoric, and refers in a derogatory manner to "cookbook econometrics" 47 without noting that the idea of cooking is brought to the fore by authors central to the debate on measurement in economics-and moreover in a way that would clarify his argument. 48 In fact, his approach fluctuates: Poor Numbers claims a relationship with the social sciences of quantification while retaining a realist vocabulary, whereas Africa barely gives these social sciences any space.
This lack of clarity is doubtless connected to the fact that Jerven seeks to preserve the idea that there are "good measures" of the economic and the social, while remaining unwilling to lean on a theoretical framework that considers economics and statistics as social practices with a fluctuating relationship to the normativity of calculation methods. While his motivation is defensible, his theoretical position is schematic. As Alain Desrosières observed, abandoning metrological 
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realism is the condition for thinking of economics as a construct. 49 This certainly does not mean renouncing consideration of the actions implemented to ensure the robustness or consistency of numbers. 50 The history of statistics affords a central role to the endeavors of statisticians seeking to attain an ideal of representation, transparency, precision, and sophistication while also questioning transformations in the conceptions and practices of constructing truth. 51 In reality, this ambiguity in Jerven's work reveals the fact that his theoretical interest lies elsewhere: primarily in the debates raised by the emergence of the quantitativist "New Economic History of Africa," the arguments of which he discusses at length. Formed in the 1990s, this school looks to describe historical dynamics using essentially econometric methods, working toward constructing new sets of long-term statistics from archival materials. 52 Jerven denounces the methods and epistemology of this school on many occasions: he criticizes in particular its weak statistical sources, its excessive trust in quantitative techniques (which in his view establishes dubious results as historical truths), and its univocal and simplistic view of historical causality. 53 Yet this dialogue provides a structure for Jerven's work, as his own ideas on quantification in Africa have also developed in response to the work of the New Economic History of Africa, for example when he seeks to revise assessments of long-term economic evolutions on the continent. 54 In comparison to his involvement in such debates, his dialogue with sociology and the history of quantification is secondary. However, by avoiding taking a clear position in regard to the lessons and theoretical postulations of those fields, he weakens the contribution of his research: he is in fact inspired by their ideas, and his results have major significance for the social sciences of statistics.
Toward a Social Analysis of Numbers in Africa
The combination of an analysis of the social conventions that guide economic measurement-showing how a quantification method can convey an understanding of the social order-and a study of economic epistemology-analyzing how the work of economists is conducted in practice, with its accommodations, arrangements, and fixes-offers a particularly promising perspective on the history of African nations since colonization. Jerven could make better use of his materials by developing them in this direction, particularly as existing research in many respects converges with his analyses. Various studies indicate that, in colonial and postcolonial contexts, government by numbers results in the use of methods that are perceived as weak and questionable. Raymond Gervais and Issiaka Mandé, for example, have shown how colonial administrators attempted to consolidate their power through rounds of censuses leading to the production of numbers-without great success, as the statistical failings of these surveys ended up reflecting the inability of the administrators to establish a legitimate political authority. 55 This observation is also demonstrated in an exemplary manner by Arjun Appadurai in regard to India, where the British colonial power ceaselessly adjusted census methods in search of the right level of state surveillance and activity. 56 In similar fashion, Gerardo Serra has shown how the trial and error of statistical surveys in the British Gold Coast (present-day Ghana) gave shape to the social world. 57 Jerven's research might easily lead to the conclusion that statistical fixes have a long history and embody the exercise of power by a permanently incomplete state. 58 By moving in this direction, the economist would contribute to writing the history of the search for "good economic measures" in Africa, which largely remains to be documented, in connection with the history and sociology of expertise. 59 Acknowledging the role played by the search for the "right" numbers is crucial to this task. My own work supports the idea that, in contrast to the common trope of the weak and absent African state, the economists and statisticians of African national administrations give shape to the social world through their expert interpretation of reality and their concern for methodology-even while they contribute to producing fictions of growth. 60 Janet Roitman (on pricing) and Vincent Bonnecase (on national income) likewise emphasize how tools of measurement were the vector by which colonial power sought to promote a social order and a vision of social justice, with limited success. 61 Such work, with a focus on the roles of statisticians in African societies, is important for research on the continent. In particular, it can help counter the exceptionalist view of forms of African government, both colonial and postcolonial, by highlighting the role played by quantification methods that are also used elsewhere in the world. What is more, it demonstrates the contribution that African case studies can make to a global history of quantification.
What Africa Can Reveal about Numbers in Society
I would now like to provide a little complementary clarification regarding the topics raised by Jerven, along with certain analytical challenges that appear particularly interesting and important. GDP, often presented as the key indicator of economic health and development, is by no means contested only in modern African contexts. After 1945, the national accounts framework was remarkably resilient and took on a range of different meanings.
62 It formed the matrix on which new economic elites affirmed themselves during the Keynesian period, as François Fourquet convincingly shows in the case of France. 63 In the so-called "developing" countries, national income and then GDP and GDP per capita were the reference indicators for measuring prosperity after World War II, until the change of tack at the World Bank under the presidency of Robert McNamara led to poverty measures being taken as the principal target of intervention from 1978.
64 GDP was not however relegated to the background for long. Despite the end of Keynesianism and large-scale Plans, in the neoliberal period the role of GDP as a reference indicator was reinforced in both Africa and the rest of the world: it has become the benchmark against which economic variables are reported; it is involved in international monitoring procedures, particularly those of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which have managed development aid since the implementation of structural adjustment programs; it is used to classify countries into categories based on their levels of wealth; and it is also used to calculate contributions to international organizations and even IMF quotas, which determine countries' level of access to resources. 65 The omnipresence of GDP in institutional procedures and economic circles has nevertheless been accompanied by constant sparring and debate. Beyond the fact that its relevance for measuring societal progress has been questioned for 61 decades, in particular for its omission of social and environmental dimensions, 66 the definitions of GDP are constantly being readjusted, leading to shows of force and negotiations in international arenas as each country defends its interpretation of international norms.
67 GDP was also controversial in the context of the ideological struggle linked to the Cold War. Consequently, Jerven's questioning of GDP indicators in relation to Africa is neither novel, nor limited to this continent. As its conventions and the relationship between what is and what is not measured are constantly evolving, economic narratives have been developed according to changing norms in many other parts of the world. Nor are the difficulties of renewing national accounts and the periodic reevaluation of data, even on a large scale, the sole prerogative of African countries: as national accounting expert Michel Séruzier recounts, the GDP of Brazil was reevaluated by several dozen percent in the 1990s, and that of Greece by 30 percent, as new sources of data were taken into account. 68 Africa is not therefore an exception when it comes to the difficulty of providing universally accepted economic data; the continent is in fact situated in a global context in which the production of numbers has caused constant debate and controversy in recent decades.
Calculating GDP in Post-Structural Adjustment Africa
However, in countries that implemented structural adjustment programs during the 1980s and 1990s-that is, the majority of states on the African continent-the calculation of GDP has taken on a particular and apparently paradoxical status. On the one hand, it is a secondary indicator, a figure that is in many ways considered to be "harmless," as Béatrice Hibou has put it. Its calculation does not attract the same attention as the figures for public deficit, the currency reserves of the Central Bank, or the balance of payments, which are perceived to have immediate and powerful consequences in terms of macroeconomic stability and the fulfillment of financial commitments.
On the other hand, GDP is regularly subject to international macroeconomic monitoring procedures, and in this capacity finds itself discussed carefully by the staff of the IMF and, to a lesser extent, the World Bank. Its modifications become strategic when they concern the estimated results for the current or immediately elapsed year: a progression in GDP effectively conditions the attainment, or nonattainment, of performance goals set as part of an agreement with the IMF. 69 therefore the subject of negotiations between international institutions and national administrations. Its calculation and adjustments are however very far from the methodological rigor and ideals of precision that generally guide the computation of national accounts. To update the most recent figures, issue forecasts, and estimate ongoing trends, the IMF uses a set of tools called "financial programming" which, although partially based on a national accounts framework, follows its own distinct logic. This financial programming enables the IMF most notably to link financial accounts with external exchanges, the state budget, and the production sector; it is nevertheless centered on the monitoring of currency and external balances. Whatever the methods used by national statistical offices, the data are discussed within this framework, authorizing the use of "tricks" that enable GDP to be adjusted up or down. 70 The careless calculation of this indicator that Jerven denounces, its very negotiable nature, is in fact an integral part of the dialogue held with the IMF and the World Bank, and forms the core of steering economic policies. In countries with an IMF program, the exclusion of national accounting from strategic activities thus sanctions the ascendancy of financial and commercial monitoring over policies encouraging growth. The manipulation of figures described by Jerven cannot be understood without taking this state of affairs into consideration.
Despite this, national accounts in the Keynesian tradition are far from being sidelined in all IMF program countries. The joint exercises put in place by national administrations and the international financial organization do not in fact lead to a uniform set of practices, but rather to a field of negotiations that result in specific choices: despite the hegemony of financial monitoring, in many Frenchspeaking countries, for example, forecasters and national accountants have developed models and tools of Keynesian inspiration with a view to negotiating with the IMF. Such work has resulted from the activities of groups and networks of French and international experts, particularly around the Agence française de développement (the French development agency, or AFD), the Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques (France's national institute of statistics and economic studies, known as the INSEE), and the Observatoire économique et statistique d'Afrique subsaharienne (the Economic and statistical observatory for sub-Saharan Africa, or AFRISTAT). 71 Since the 1980s, these networks have sought to promote an approach that, to a certain extent, resists the liberal approach of the IMF by enabling the development of macroeconomic models and GDP estimation schemas in a range of countries. 72 As a result, studying methods of GDP calculation effectively amounts to analyzing the way in which a state forms a collaboration and establishes power relationships with the IMF through technical exercises. It also provides an entry point for analyzing the production of a discourse and the ways that state thinking is incorporated into the conventions of growth measurement. 73 It thus appears that Jerven's work emphasizes only one part of the puzzle of calculating growth. By focusing on national accountants, development economists, and individuals in charge of managing databases-particularly at the World Bankhe largely sidelines a number of decisive actors. The work of economists in charge of steering programs for particular countries and carrying out statistical monitoring within the regional units of the IMF and the World Bank is essential. Experts from the statistics departments of these international bodies also play an important role in providing technical assistance to countries, as do many statisticians and economists from private consultancy firms or cooperation agencies. Nor should we overlook the national administration staff in charge of macroeconomic studies and forecasting, separate from the national accounts, who are also at the heart of work on GDP. Jerven's work would benefit from describing this diversity of actors and rationales in more detail.
Such efforts would enable him to explain and deepen the complexity of some of the assessments at the heart of his work. For example, one of the arguments used to prove the arbitrary nature of international databases concerns the methods used by organizations when national data are missing. Jerven presents these procedures as a source of arbitrariness, or at best lack of transparency, 74 but this description does not go far enough. Without dismissing the arbitrariness, which he is right to highlight, in reality these circumstances lead to very distinct practices. 75 The IMF area economist overseeing a particular country is often obliged by the executive board of the institution to provide a figure in order to comply with the imperative of monitoring, and is thus invited to partake in statistical creativity; an executive from the statistical departments of the IMF may, on the other hand, leave the box in the database blank if he or she considers the national figures to be unavailable or incompatible with international norms. An executive from the United Nations is meanwhile obliged to faithfully reproduce the data provided by his or her member state out of respect for its voice, whereas national accountants balance their books based on an accounting logic, and statisticians dealing with the balance of payments have an "errors and omissions" option. It is often through examining seeming trivialities that one is able to penetrate the density of social practices and rationales at work in the construction of numbers. The description of GDP calculations requires a more sustained focus on these elements than Jerven provides.
This call for a "sociology of filling in tables" reminds us that GDP data, even when questionable, bear the traces of the actions and ways of thinking of a range of actors. 76 Inspired by the way Giovanni Levi makes use of a seventeenth-century Piedmont exorcist's bookkeeping, 77 simple tables of economic growth data could serve as the springboard for a study of a plurality of mentalities and rationales, both today and in the past.
African Statistics and Historical Controversies
I will conclude my argument by noting that Jerven's study is situated within a history of controversies concerning the quantification of development, particularly in regard to GDP. There are numerous examples of criticism opposing measures of economic activity in Africa over the course of history, and of the responses this criticism has engendered. In the 1960s, as Desrosières reminded us, a working group was established in Algeria within which Pierre Bourdieu and statisticians from the INSEE endeavored to investigate the measurement of unpaid work. 78 In the 1970s, a few years after the term "informal economy" was invented by anthropologist Keith Hart, 79 a study was carried out by a group of statisticians, development experts, and researchers (economists, sociologists, and geographers) to measure the contribution of the "informal sector" to GDP in Tunisia. They belonged to the group Amélioration des méthodes d'investigation en milieu rural africain (Improvement of study methods in African rural settings, or AMIRA), which was jointly created by several French public institutions to develop categories and statistical methods more strongly anchored in the sociological and anthropological realities of developing countries. 80 These concerns also drove the work led by economist-demographer Jean-Marie Cour in the 1980s and the first half of the 1990s, first at the World Bank and then as part of the Sahel Club within the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Cour developed alternative methods for bringing national accounts closer to real economies, most notably through the use of regional GDP calculations that included operations usually considered to be non-observable-particularly non-monetized exchanges and unregistered transactions. This method was also the focus of a famous book on Zaire by the anthropologist Janet MacGaffey, who presented official GDP as devoid of meaning, due to 76. Samuel, "La production macroéconomique du réel," 188 sq. the existence of a "second economy" which it completely ignores. 81 It is precisely because statistics have been subject to constant criticism in developing countries that, as Desrosières remarked, there have been many innovations in this space, including remarkable collaborations between statisticians and social scientists. 82 Jerven himself notes this in a highly interesting way when he looks at early calculations of national income, but is less attentive when it comes to recent innovations. 83 Such an observation urges a reformulation of the question posed by Jerven: If challenges to the reliability of statistics are so recurrent and well established, and if the inadequacies of numbers are well known, why are the criticized methods still in use? Focusing on household living conditions and poverty may shed valuable light on this topic. Studies aiming to measure household consumption have been a central concern for development experts since the 1950s, 84 but criticism has consistently been leveled at this method of measuring consumption. Is it even possible to define households, which have ambiguous and fluctuating boundaries, and are made up of individuals with highly heterogeneous statuses? Pioneering work posed such questions in the British and French colonies in the 1940s and 1950s, 85 and in the 1960s Anita Bensaïd and her colleagues at the INSEE led research into the inadequacy of household surveys in Africa. 86 In the 1970s, a number of initiatives within the AMIRA group were doing the same: Philippe Couty produced a notable report on experiments conducted by French statisticians in Cameroon (1963 Cameroon ( -1964 and Upper Volta (1974); his testimony even shows that giving up the study of households in Africa to focus on individuals was considered. 87 At the beginning of the 1980s, anthropologist Jane Guyer published a work highlighting the importance of internal dynamics and social relationships within African households, questioning the relevance of household-level studies. 88 Despite recurrent criticism and marginal shifts in methods, 89 however, no satisfactory and pragmatic solution has been found to replace this "household" category-a situation overwhelmingly due to the lack of credible alternatives. 90 It has thus become ritual, for statisticians as well as users of data, to discredit the results of consumption studies by blaming both the poor quality of the statistical operations and their lack of relevance.
Guyer provides an illuminating perspective on this situation in a piece of work cowritten with an economist, Christopher Udry, in which the two researchers tackle an enigma that had remained unsolved for several decades. 91 In 1957, anthropologist and economist Polly Hill observed that household expenditure in Ghana did not appear to conform to commonly accepted economic laws, as the proportion spent on food did not fall as incomes increased-violating the so-called Engel's law. 92 Hill was struck by this observation, which appeared to indicate that rich households fed more individuals than poor households, but the result seemed plausible to her in view of the workings of Ghanaian society. 93 Many analysts saw it however as proof of the difficulty of using survey data, since such a result seemed neither consistent nor thinkable in view of standard economic theories. 94 As the question remained unanswered, Guyer undertook to compare Hill's intuition with data from a much more recent study, the Ghana Living Standards Survey from 1991-1992. With Udry's help, she constructed aggregate expenditures entirely different from those usually found in statisticians' reports, seeking in particular to distinguish household spending on external individuals-expenses that could be considered as investments in solidarity networks. 95 Thirty years later, the two researchers were thus able to validate Hill's observation, even though the data from this 1991-1992 study were often considered to be of low reliability and discredited. 96 They also showed that it is not necessarily true that the realities described by the social sciences cannot be understood through the standard tools of economists, in contrast to Hill's lament that "the gulf between social anthropologists and economists is so terrifying that even the simplest anthropological ideas are liable to disappear into thin air when one is pursuing economic survey work in the field." 97 Moreover, they proved that questioning the relevance of statistics, a criticism as old as the data themselves, is sometimes overly hasty. The scope of the thinkable often limits the way in which numbers relating to Africa are approached and criticized. Yet, as Jerven's work on GDP helps illustrate, they bear multiple traces of the social world and have much to reveal, inviting us to further tease out the threads of the complex intricacies underlying calculations of African growth.
The central argument in Jerven's work is that the economic and social realities of African countries, heterogeneous and singular, largely escape both quantification and the analyses of economists. In his opinion, this situation is explained by a lack of rigor in the implementation of calculation procedures and the weakness of African statistical institutions, exacerbated by international organizations producing their own figures and feeding databases that are taken as authoritative despite their lack of transparency. Academics, journalists, and administrative and political leaders do not hesitate, moreover, to use these questionable statistical data to construct scientific analyses or justify public policy decisions as if they were robust. Criticism of this situation is the focus of Jerven's recent works, 98 which hold international institutions particularly responsible for having neglected to fund statistics for decades, and for having ignored-or pretended to ignore-the weakness of the economic analyses carried out in regard to these countries. 99 Jerven's analyses have very rich empirical and comparative significance, as well as historical depth, and make a valuable contribution to the social sciences. In my view, however, his descriptions and problematization are insufficient to provide a full picture of the social and political impact of quantification practices in Africa. In 1988, Desrosières observed that criticism of the simplification of reality generated by statistics is as old as the discipline itself-this accusation has notably been leveled at supporters of statistics by the authors of in-depth monographs.
100 Writing the history of quantification and its role in the social world does not therefore mean starting from a denunciation of these simplifications, which are an integral part of the statistical project. Rather, it is above all a question of tracing the rise of a way of thinking and the implementation of quantification procedures. From this point of view, the position taken by Jerven in his recent works is incomplete and leaves him open to criticism. With his focus on demonstrating the irrelevance of statistics and economic studies carried out at the international level in Africa, he does too little to characterize the diversity of social practices on which quantification activities are based, too little to appreciate their historicity or to study the forces that have placed them at the center of government in the modern world. I would suggest four main areas of focus in order to extend his work in such directions. First, it is necessary to describe the "statistical chains" at work in the production and use of economic data on Africa. 101 The manufacture of numbers involves a wide variety of actors: those who collect and input data, computer scientists, statisticians, modeling experts, the international civil servants who verify, pass on, and include these data in aid management procedures, the consultants and private firms involved in different stages of production. 102 How is the existence of these worlds of quantification manifested in Africa? And how do their interactions result in the quantification of the continent? The production of these numbers also involves many power relationships: between groups of civil servants or state institutions with different visions of "good quantification methods," and between African national administrations and the international organizations-the IMF and World Bank in particular-with which economic aggregates are often negotiated. While Jerven's work aims to prove the existence of questionable or arbitrary numbers (at the risk of focusing on actions that contribute to the development of unrealistic data), it is nevertheless necessary to bring out the plurality of these rationales in order to understand the social and political implications of quantification. The existence of numerical fictions or unreliable numbers in no way undermines the importance of a detailed political sociology of statistics. 103 Second, a sociopolitical and historical analysis of quantification practices must be supported by an appropriate analytical framework. Jerven passes with ease from a conventionalist reading of calculation methods (in his account of changing statistical techniques throughout history), to a realist interpretation of measurement, which he notably adopts to denounce "bad statistics" and to call for an "exact" history of economic changes in Africa. This inconsistent position can be avoided. It is possible to consider at once the socially constructed nature of statistical norms and methods, and the fact that calculations are uncertain actions that may lead to weak, if not obscure, formulations. The sociology and history of science enable measurement to be understood as a series of ad hoc fixes. 104 The historical sociology of politics helps us consider the embedding of economic calculations in bureaucratic processes, where respecting norms may lead to the production of fictional narratives. 105 The sociology of quantification prompts us to analyze calculation as a series of classification, coding, and measuring operations that, while reflecting historically constructed conventions, are also judgments and manifestations of economic and social reality. 106 The need to apply such conceptual frameworks to quantification in Africa is not simply a theoretical concern. Throughout the twentieth century, African statistical institutions have often been weak, and individual states, first colonial and then national, have pursued the project of quantifying economies and societies while governing with the assistance of patched-together figures of low reliability. Studying the trajectories of the state and government by numbers in Africa thus requires a foundation from which to develop a fine-grained analysis of the social and political significance of quantification practices and their transformations, including when statistical techniques have been implemented in unfavorable conditions. Envisaging the study of statistics from this perspective also makes it possible to consider the contribution of African case studies to the historical sociology of quantification on other continents.
Third, the rise of international comparisons and econometric techniques should be recontextualized within the history of economic governance in Africa. In his recent works, Jerven insists on the omnipresence of certain procedures in the production of economic and statistical studies of the continent: the use of international databases to compare and rank countries, and the realization of econometric studies on the determinants of growth. 107 He implies that these practices have become hegemonic within development economics, but shows this only partially. Which professional groups and which institutions (state, academic, financial or non-governmental) have promoted these practices? In contrast, what debate, resistance, and dissidence have they provoked? And which institutions or academic schools of thought have not given in to such ways of operating and reasoning? Providing a response to these questions would make it possible to develop a genealogy of current trends in development macroeconomics, going beyond the criticism of flaws observed in the production of certain economic and statistical schools. The work produced by these econometric comparisons and analyses may or may not be reappropriated by national governments. If we are to determine how they actually influence economic governance in Africa, and how they become techniques of government emblematic of a particular historical moment, then it is necessary to analyze their circulation at the national level.
Finally, the criticism of GDP and growth studies should be related to the history of debates about quantification in Africa. For decades, the statistical methods and categories used to provide numbers on the continent have been subject to debate and have inspired multiple critical analyses. Such criticism has come from development professionals questioning their own practices, from social scientists challenging the relevance of statistical knowledge in Africa, or from institutions attempting to promote statistical methods better adapted to the economic and social realities of the continent. 109 Jerven's work would benefit from allocating such critiques and their results a more central place. How have numbers relating to Africa been so roundly condemned and yet remained at the center of social and political life in the nations that make up the continent? How have debates about measurement influenced the status of quantification and its social role in African societies, as well as within the communities of professionals and experts charged with producing or using it? The academic or expert knowledge that has questioned the relevance of African statistics forms an important part of the history of quantification practices on the continent.
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